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HALL AND MATTI

This report provides an analysis and evaluation of the proposed city-county
consolidation in St. Louis. The report draws upon theoretical research
considering the impact of local government consolidations on efficiency,
equity, spillovers, and development. Where possible, we connect the ideas
from the academic literature to arguments made regarding the situation in St.
Louis. After exploring both the theoretical reasons for and against
consolidation, we consider the real-world empirical evidence. Although citycounty consolidations sometimes lead to positive outcomes, often they do
not. Importantly, the context of consolidation matters. By understanding the
importance of context with consolidations, we conclude with five lessons for
citizens and policymakers in St. Louis drawn from our understanding of the
relevant research. Although there are local government problems in St. Louis,
city-county consolidation is not necessarily the only or best way forward.
1. INTRODUCTION
The county of St. Louis is one of the most politically fragmented in the
United States. According to Better Together,1 a group in favor of municipal
reform in St. Louis County, the county contains 90 municipal governments,
57 police departments, 81 municipal courts, and 43 fire districts. This political
fragmentation has been argued to lead to a number of problems, including
wasteful competition among local governments, inefficient duplication of
services, an inability to coordinate efforts geared towards regional growth,
and a disparity in services across the county. Many of these complaints
regarding the consequences of political fragmentation in St. Louis County are
not unique to Missouri, and the problems of excessive political fragmentation
have been discussed in the academic literature for nearly 100 years.2
In this paper, we aim to bring a discussion of the scholarly literature to the
debate surrounding local governance in St. Louis County. In particular, we
focus our attention on city-county consolidation. We do so for two reasons.
First, much of the discussion of reform in St. Louis has focused on citycounty consolidation.3 Second, city-county consolidation has been a major
push in many metropolitan areas of the United States over the past 50 years.
These consolidation attempts, and the findings of the scholars that have
studied them, can give policymakers some insight into opportunities for
improvement in regional governance and potential pitfalls to avoid. As
authors of two recent papers on city-county consolidation, we employ our
understanding of the literature, combined with our own original research, to
1

provide citizens and policymakers of St. Louis County
with insights and lessons from the academic literature
on city-county consolidation.
We proceed as follows. We begin by summarizing the
theoretical arguments in favor of consolidation in
Section 2, followed by the theoretical arguments against
consolidation in Section 3. Where possible we try to link
discussion from the academic literature to arguments
made regarding the situation in St. Louis. Section 4
discusses the empirical literature on city-county
consolidation. In Section 5 we provide five lessons for
citizens and policymakers in St. Louis drawn from our
reading of the relevant research. Section 6 provides
some closing comments.
2. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR
OF CONSOLIDATION
The United States traditionally has had a fragmented
system of government. Currently, there are nearly
90,000 separate governmental units in the United
States.4 With one federal government and 50 state
governments, the fragmentation of governments occurs
at the local level. Local political units are divided into
counties, municipalities, townships, school districts, and
other special districts that serve a specific function, such
as police districts. Over the last 100 years, there has
been an increasing push to consolidate local
governments. Policy makers and local activists have
steadily reduced the fragmentation of local government
through consolidation efforts. Concurrent with the realworld changes in local government, a body of
scholarship in support of consolidation has emerged.
Although studied by scholars across different decades
and in different local contexts, their arguments in favor
of consolidation tend to fall into four categories:
efficiency, equity, spillovers, and development. This
section explores each of these four theoretical
arguments in favor of consolidation and draws
connections between the theory and the specific context
of St. Louis.
2.1 Efficiency
Scholars in favor of consolidation contend that simple
systems of government are more efficient. A
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fragmented system of government with overlapping
jurisdictions is not a simple system. It is complex, and
its complexity can lead to inefficiency. In terms of
government, inefficiency leads to higher costs and poor
service provision. Scholars in favor of consolidation
identify several ways in which larger governments
operate more efficiently.
First, larger government can achieve economies of scale.
Just as a larger factory can lead to lower average costs in
the private sector, a larger government can theoretically
lower average costs of producing goods and services in
the public sector. With economies of scale, larger
governments can provide services at a lower per unit
cost. A related, but different mechanism can occur
through bulk purchasing. A larger organization can
reduce costs because of greater purchasing power.5 The
principle is simple: Sam’s Club is cheaper than Walmart.
Just as buying in bulk saves money for households,
buying in bulk can lead to lower costs for governments,
the savings of which can be passed along to taxpayers.
Another theoretical reason for economies of scale with
larger governments comes from spreading the fixed
costs of government programs across more people.6
Services such as power and public transportation are
capital intensive and require a large initial investment.
But once built the marginal cost of adding an additional
user is low. Thus, in smaller governments each citizen
will bear a higher fraction of the large fixed costs of
capital intensive services. Their tax bill will be higher to
cover the cost, or the capital intensive service will
simply not be provided. In a larger government,
however, the high fixed costs of capital intensive
services can be spread across a larger number of people.
Thus, each citizen’s tax bill is lower.
A third way large governments achieve economies of
scale is through removing administrative duplication.7
For example, two small municipalities likely have the
same administrative structure and types of
administrative employees: Each municipality is likely to
have its own public works department, zoning
commission can be em, etc. Such duplication can be
wasteful. Rather than duplicated administrative
structures and employees, a consolidated government
can cut operating costs through a single administrative
2
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system with a streamlined number of employees.
The second efficiency argument for consolidation
related to economies of scale is economies of scope.
Economies of scale are achieved through lower average
costs when providing a larger quantity of a single
service. Economies of scope come from the cost of
providing a diversified set of services within a single
government being less than the cost of several
specialized governments providing the same services.8
For example, rather than separate dispatch centers for
police and fire departments, a unified dispatch center
for police and fire departments would be more efficient.
The third efficiency argument for consolidation comes
from a careful study of what the nature of fragmented
government in the United States is like. Of the
approximately 90,000 governments in the United States,
over half are school districts or other types of special
districts.9 Special districts are designed to achieve
efficiency through their focus on providing a single
service, such as fire, police, public utilities, and housing
authorities. Although special districts could be efficient,
special districts can be controlled by special interest
groups. With a focus on a single issue, special districts
tend to be less politically visible, allowing groups with a
vested interest in a specific issue to exert greater
influence.10 For example, teachers are more than twice
as likely to vote in school district elections as other
registered voters.11 Special interest influence erodes
efficiency as policy is shaped to suit special interest
rather than the more general public interest.
Additionally, special districts can result in higher costs
because they face less competition. In the marketplace,
more competition leads to lower costs and higher
quality. The same is true with government. More
competition can lead to lower costs of operation and
thus lower taxes and better service provision. However,
different types of special districts are not in competition
with one another.12 For example, a school district and a
public utility company may operate in the same
geographic area, but they provide different services and
are therefore not competitors.
Another way special districts lack competition is with
the high cost of moving to another jurisdiction because
HALL AND MATTI

of one service provision.13 For example, if all services
are provided by a municipal government and the
municipal government in doing a poor job of providing
all the services, citizens may relocate to a municipality
with better governance. Governments face competition
because the threat of losing citizens through migration
to other municipalities. The threat of moving is muted
when citizens receive services from a plethora of special
districts, however. Consider the case of citizens living in
an area where the public utility company is inefficient.
Moving because of one poorly provided service is
unlikely, especially if other special districts, such as a
school district, police department, and fire department,
operate efficiently. With less of a threat of moving,
special districts face less competition, and the lack of
competition can erode efficiency.
Efficiency arguments for consolidation have been
prominent among scholars over the last 100 years.
Efficiency also has been part of the debate over St.
Louis city-county consolidation. Those in favor of
consolidation have felt a general sense that
fragmentation is unnecessarily complicated. Two reports
have provided specific examples that support the
general sentiment of consolidation as efficiencyenhancing. One report, conducted by The PFM Group
in 2011, estimated the efficiency gains from a variety of
collaboration possibilities between the City of St. Louis
and St. Louis County.14 The other report, conducted by
the pro-consolidation group Better Together, argues for
consolidation for a variety of reasons, including
efficiency.15 Although not referenced in either report,
the arguments in each are related to the scholarly body
of research in favor of consolidation.
The research argues that economies of scale exist in
larger governments because of lower input prices due to
greater bargaining power,16 removing administrative
duplication,17 and spreading fixed costs across a larger
number of citizens.18 Each reason also has been voiced
within the St. Louis consolidation context. With greater
purchasing power through consolidation, a unified St.
Louis would save money on insurance and raw
materials, such as asphalt and salt19 For example, The
PFM Group estimates $2 million in savings each year
from merging insurance plans for public employees.
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In line with Adams,20 achieving greater administrative
efficiency has been prominent in the St. Louis
consolidation debate. With 684 local elected officials
(more than Congress) across the region and the
departments they oversee, there is substantial potential
for reducing administrative duplication.21 For example,
one suggestion has been to centralize the process of
hiring and training new employees, particularly in the
area of healthcare.22 More streamlined hiring and
training means fewer administrators and offices are
needed. Besides specific ways of reducing
administration costs, Better Together23 compares St.
Louis to similar areas that have consolidated their
governments. They find that the merged LouisvilleJefferson County government has 41% lower per capita
administration costs than in St. Louis. While many argue
for greater administrative efficiency through
consolidation, some remain skeptical. Greenblatt casts
doubt on the magnitude of savings possible by merging
the small municipalities in the county.24 The small
municipalities, those with 6,000 residents or less, only
account for 4% of all metropolitan spending across the
county.
Consistent with Ostrom, Better Together has identified
ways in which the current fragmented system fails to
provide capital-intensive services efficiently.25 An
example is the small fire departments across the county
that currently cannot afford heavy rescue squads or
hazmat teams. Individual municipalities simply are not
large enough to spread the fixed costs of the expensive
equipment required for heavy rescue squads or hazmat
teams across its citizens in a cost-effective way.
However, consolidated government could afford
dedicated heavy rescue squads and hazmat teams.

cycle of racial and wealth discrimination arises as
fragmentation reinforces preferences for separation
along these two dimensions. Fragmented governments
can more easily operate along racial and wealth
dimensions. With greater separation, trust and sympathy
among different races and wealth classes declines, which
leads to even greater desires to formally separate society
into local jurisdictions comprised of homogeneous
residents.27 (Lowery 2000).
The second set of theoretical arguments for
consolidation based on equity concerns pertains to the
Tiebout model.28 The Tiebout model is often framed in
terms of enhancing efficiency. Rather than people
sorting into different jurisdictions based upon the
efficiency of local governments, however, people sort
into different jurisdictions based upon racial and wealth
dimensions. Lifestyle preferences divide people into
different social worlds,29 so that sorting into local
jurisdictions is not about efficiency but instead about
maintaining lifestyles.30 This results in racial segregation
and wealth inequality across local jurisdictions.
Consolidation breaks down the jurisdictional barriers
that sort people into different social worlds.

2.2 Equity

The Tiebout model also can explain why large scale
income redistribution programs are not likely at the
local level. In the Tiebout model, local jurisdictions
compete with each other for tax revenue sources
(residents and businesses). Since high-income earners
and businesses are highly mobile31 and are the largest
sources of tax revenue, Tiebout competition prompts
local jurisdictions to underprovide redistributive
services.32 While poor households would prefer more
redistributive services, with fragmented governments
they can be more easily neglected as local jurisdictions
cater to businesses and wealthy residents.

Arguments in favor of consolidation based upon equity
considerations fall into two categories. First,
fragmentation acts as an institutional barrier that helps
promote racial segregation and wealth disparities.26 In
this theory, Hill elites use zoning restrictions to prevent
poorer residents from living in their jurisdictions. The
result is enclaves of wealthy, white suburbanites and
pockets of poverty in minority jurisdictions, both in the
central city and in older inner-ring suburbs. A vicious

When Tiebout competition functions, inequality of
income, wealth, and/or outcomes is the result. People
often sort into different jurisdictions (e.g., school
district)based upon race and income rather than
government efficiency. Even if jurisdictions are similar
in incomes, deviations in preferences for locally
provided goods such as education, can lead to inequality
of outcomes. Local jurisdictions cater to businesses and
wealthy elites rather than poor households. However, if

HALL AND MATTI
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the Tiebout model fails to function, the result can be
even greater inequality. The exit of businesses and
wealthy residents can leave behind jurisdictions with a
limited tax base from which even the most basic
services will be underprovided.33 Consolidation reduces
equity concerns by drawing people out of their
homogenous racial and income-based bubbles into a
more unified, equitable jurisdiction.
As has been the case with other city-county
consolidations, equity concerns are a primary motivation
behind the push for consolidation in St. Louis. In both
the historical and contemporary calls for consolidation
in St. Louis, equity has been a relevant factor.
Consistent with Hill,34 the initial separation between St.
Louis County and the City of St. Louis was headed by
businesses and land-owning elites.35 They wanted low
taxes and a greater ability to generate wealth with less
government interference.
Consistent with Lowery,36 over time the separation of
the city and county has fostered mistrust. Previous failed
attempts to reunite St. Louis governments have
occurred in part because either the city or county felt
like the other side was getting the better end of the
bargain and would become too powerful.37 (Bose 2014;
Jones 2014). For example, with the 1987 consolidation
proposal, one mayor wondered if consolidation was “a
secret, sinister plan in the works that would… dismantle
all cities headed by black elected officials in St. Louis
County?” (Bose 2014). One reason why consolidation
has been difficult to achieve in the past is because of
mistrust across jurisdictions lines that is exacerbated by
racial and income differences.
Equity has been a concern historically, but it is also a
concern with the current consolidation push in St.
Louis. Better Together38 documents many of the
disparities in service provisions across municipalities in
St. Louis County. The disparities tend to run along racial
lines. It also descriobes the service provision disparity
across two municipalities: Des Peres and Pine Lawn.
Des Peres has a population that is 94.3% white, with a
median household income of $116,000. Residents enjoy
amenities such as a high-end recreational facility and
zero-price trash and leaf collection. On the other
extreme is Pine Lawn, with a population that is 97.7%
HALL AND MATTI

black and a median household income of $26,632. The
municipality can no longer afford a police department
and restricted operating hours at a newly built park
because of safety concerns. According to Better
Together, these two municipalities highlight the service
provision disparities that operate according to wealth
and race.
2.3 Spillovers
Research has not only identified efficiency and equity as
key benefits of larger, consolidated governments, but
also the ability of larger jurisdictions to internalize
externalities; that is, the benefits or costs of activity in
one region that may spill over into other jurisdictions.
Solé-Ollé39 identifies two types of spillovers. ‘Benefit
spillovers’ result from public goods produced in one
jurisdiction being used in other jurisdictions. A radio or
TV broadcast produced within one municipality that are
enjoyed by residents of other municipalities is an
example of a benefit spillover. ‘Crowding spillovers’
result from citizens of one jurisdictions crowding into
the public goods of another jurisdiction. Recreational
facilities, such as parks in one municipality, that become
crowded by commuters and visitors from other
municipalities is a type of crowding spillover. Theory
identifies why fragmentation exacerbates spillovers and
how consolidated can help contain spillovers.
Williams40 explains how fragmentation creates spillover
problems. Local government leaders make decisions
based upon the costs and benefits to their constituents.
When evaluating policy, they do not consider societal
costs and benefits. If there are negative spillover
affecting residents outside of their jurisdiction,
government leaders often do not take these external
costs into account. Thus, there will be an overprovision
of the public good in one jurisdiction because the costs
accruing to other jurisdictions is not part of the local
decision-making process. Fragmentation exacerbates the
problem of spillovers, because with smaller regions
spillovers are more likely. With negative spillovers,
public goods are overproduced: With positive
spillovers, public goods are underproduced. And in
cases such as air pollution programs where the benefits
are spread widely across a region while the costs are
concentrated, the public good may simply not be
5
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provided.41
With fragmented government, the problem of spillovers
will be exacerbated. The solution is simple: expand the
size of the jurisdictional boundaries. Larger,
consolidated governments can overcome spillovers by
drawing jurisdictional boundaries coterminous with the
area enjoying the benefits and bearing the costs of the
public good.42 With larger jurisdictions, the costs and
benefits of a project are contained within the region. In
theory, the larger jurisdiction reduces spillovers, and
public goods would be provided at the socially optimal
level.
A primary motivation behind consolidation in St. Louis
is related directly to the effects of spillovers. St. Louis
municipalities engage in tax exporting. Rather than
taxing their own residents, municipalities create negative
spillovers by attempting to have residents from other
municipalities finance government in their area. It is a
politically expedient maneuver as citizens in the
municipality enjoy a lower tax bill. However, from a
regional perspective, it is not optimal because it can lead
to expenditures that are out of line with voter
preferences, since part of the cost of public services are
born by non-residents of an area. It also tends to orient
government activity towards encouraging development
towards larger projects that attract visitors and thus
leads to more tax exporting.
Better Together43 identifies two ways in which tax
exporting operates across St. Louis municipalities. First,
municipalities battle over sales tax revenue. Local sales
taxes have been legal in Missouri since 1969. Over time
municipalities adopted specific local sales taxes to such
an extent that sales tax revenue is the largest source of
funding for 69 of St. Louis’s 92 municipalities. In
contrast, nationally it is property taxation that is the
primary source for local government revenue. They also
explain how the system may look appealing to an
individual municipality, but is actually destructive for the
region: “raising taxes on your own citizens is politically
unpopular, while attracting retail and spreading the cost
burden across a million potential customers levies an
indirect tax on a far greater pool of people, many of
whom do not have a vote in that municipality’s local
elections.”44 Reflecting the concerns of Williams,45
HALL AND MATTI

benefits from government programs go to citizens of a
municipality while the costs are borne by those outside
of the municipality.
Municipalities attempt to export taxes by increasing
their sales taxes and expanding their sales tax base. The
battle over sales tax revenue has led to the inefficient
use of Tax Increment Financing (TIF). TIF plans
typically offer tax benefits to attract businesses to locate
in a particular region. Given the small size of St. Louis
municipalities, TIF has been used not to attract new
businesses into the St. Louis region, but to entice a
business to relocate from one municipality to another.46
This benefits the municipality that attracts the business
and new tax base but at the expense of another
municipality from which the business fled. Sales tax
exporting is not consistent with Adams,47 because
jurisdictional boundaries do not contain costs and
benefits.
The second way St. Louis municipalities engage in tax
exporting is through municipal fines and fees. Better
Together argues that in municipalities that cannot
generate sufficient revenue through local sales taxes,
fines and court fees are used as revenue sources instead.
In 2009 a large shopping center in the municipality of
St. Ann closed. In response, St. Ann significantly
increased traffic citations, and over the next four years,
revenue from municipal fines and fees increased
fourfold. Once again, local leaders considered only the
costs and benefits to their citizens;48 larger jurisdictional
lines would better contain the costs and benefits.49
2.4 Development
Three reasons have been identified for why
consolidation can increase economic development in a
region. First, consolidation increases comprehensive
planning capacity.50 Larger governments can justify a
specialized department focusing on development.
Additionally, rather than smaller governments
competing with one another to increase development
only in their jurisdiction, larger governments facilitate
cooperation to maximize development across the
broader region.
Second, consolidation simplifies the regulatory process.
6
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With a single department to deal with, business activity
comes with less uncertainty and fewer costs of doing
business. As Feiock and Carr point out, with a unified
development department in a consolidated government,
businesses do not have to deal with obtaining permits
from multiple agencies, but only a single department.51
By simplifying the regulatory process, consolidated
governments foster business expansion.
Third, consolidation enables large regional development
projects. Consolidation leads to a large resource base
that enables bigger projects to be financed.52 Projects
such as mass transit systems and sports stadiums are
regional in nature and are best financed through a
regional consolidated government. This is because if the
benefits of a development project extend beyond the
boundaries of a jurisdiction but the costs are borne
within the jurisdiction, then projects that are socially
optimal will not be undertaken.53 For example, a sole
municipality is unlikely to invest in a sports stadium
because the municipality would bear the full cost while
the benefits of being able to attend games or watch on
TV would extend beyond the boundaries of the
municipality.
Each of the theoretical reasons outlined above has
surfaced in the St. Louis consolidation debate.
Consistent with Fleischmann and Green,54 Gordon55
points out that the small municipalities in the St. Louis
area compete with each other from the same pool of
state government funding. With consolidation, the
municipalities could cooperate to receive a higher level
of state development funds. In addition to competing
over state funding, St. Louis municipalities also compete
for businesses. Rather than economic development to
attract businesses from outside the region,
municipalities are using economic development to
attract businesses from neighboring municipalities.56 It is
a zero-sum game. When one municipality wins, another
loses. Comprehensive planning at the regional level
would be a positive-sum game. Attracting new
businesses from other metro areas to St. Louis benefits
the whole region. This competition with other regions
rather than local competition has also been part of the
debate in St. Louis. Lyda Krewson, the mayor of St.
Louis, contends that municipalities are arguing over in
which local municipality a new project should locate
HALL AND MATTI

rather than thinking about how to compete with other
metro areas.57
The theoretical literature also suggests that the
regulatory complexity that accompanies fragmentation is
bad for business.58 The current regulatory systems in the
area are highly complex and inefficient. Better
Together59 has identified two problems with the status
quo. First, across the region, there are over 90 different
ways of obtaining a business license. Different licensing
requirements across different municipalities makes it
costly (and difficult) for business owners to effectively
establish and operate businesses across multiple
municipalities in the St. Louis area. Second, most of the
small municipalities simply do not have a dedicated
development division to adequately deal with business
licenses and other requests from businesses.
Consolidation should enable large regional development
projects.60 Support for consolidation in line with the
theory has surfaced in the St. Louis debate. In a
December 2017 newspaper interview, the president of
the St. Louis Blues hockey team argued that the
difficulty in securing financing for upgrades to the
soccer stadium and ice hockey arena stemmed directly
from government fragmentation.61 The difficulty of
financing large development projects extends beyond
sports facilities. Better Together62 argues that the
existing municipalities are too small to enter the capital
debt market to invest in basic development projects,
such as the improvement to roads and bridges.
3. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST
CONSOLIDATION
There is a tradition of fragmented government in the
United States. Given strong sentiments among
American citizens, it is not surprising that since 1815
only 39 out of 166 proposed city-county consolidations
have been implemented successfully through a popular
vote.63 But the arguments against consolidation are not
only felt by citizens: they have also been worked out by
scholars over the last 100 years. Just like the arguments
for consolidation, the theoretical arguments against
consolidation fall into four categories: efficiency, equity,
spillovers, and development. This section explores the
research opposing consolidation in each of these four
7
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areas. As before, we draw connections between the
research and the current debate in St. Louis.
3.1 Efficiency
Scholars skeptical of the efficiency gains of
consolidation have developed theories demonstrating
the inefficiency of larger, consolidated governments.
The arguments fall into one of three categories: A
fragmented system of government: helps keep costs
down; benefits from increased competition; and most
effectively provides what citizens want out of their local
governments.
There are three reasons for why larger, consolidated
governments are theorized to be less cost-effective.
First, it is difficult to discern what the costs and benefits
of any single service is if services are bundled.64 If all
local government services from public utilities to parks
departments were bundled together, it would be difficult
to know what value to the individual each service is
providing. This leads to less public scrutiny over local
service-provision, which reduces any incentives to keep
costs down.
Second, with larger governments comes more
complexity. Rather than a streamlined bureaucracy such
as might be found with a smaller governmental unit
(think small town), consolidation can increase
administrative costs as more hierarchical structures lead
to ‘bureaucratic congestion’.65 Having a dozen smaller
bureaucracies is not necessarily less efficient than a
single, larger bureaucracy when it comes to dealing with
a specific, local issue. Coordination among
administrators may break down as the system becomes
too complex.
Third, providing services across larger geographic areas
is not necessarily more efficient. One simple reason is
that costs increase when servicing outer, more remote
regions.66 A snow plow covering a region with a radius
of 10 miles uses less fuel than a snow plow covering a
region with a radius of 20 miles. Additionally, a single
larger jurisdiction may be efficient for some services but
not for others. There are different optimal sizes for
public goods provision.67 A school district may be more
efficiently provided at a highly local level while a public
HALL AND MATTI

utility company may operate more efficiently at a
regional level. Providing all services at the same
geographic level eliminates the possibility of providing
all services efficiently.
In terms of competition, there also are three reasons for
why larger, consolidated governments are theorized to
be less cost-effective. First, “voting with your feet” is
costlier in larger, consolidated governments.68 At the
local level, if citizens are dissatisfied with government in
their municipality, they could vote with their feet by
moving to another municipality. The threat of citizen
migration incentivizes local governments to operate
efficiently. However, at larger geographic levels, voting
with your feet is costlier: Moving to another state likely
means leaving behind family, friends, and employment,
unlike with moving to an adjacent municipality.
Second, even if citizens do not move away from
jurisdictions with bad governance, competitive pressures
still exist through voice69 and “yardstick” competition.70
Citizens can voice their frustrations in town hall
meetings at the local level and propose alternative
policies. Through yardstick competition, citizens can
compare their local government to nearby local
governments. With a special district, such as a school
district, a citizen can easily evaluate how their school
district compares to a nearby school district. If their
school district is underperforming, they could vote
against incumbent school board members in the next
election. With fragmentation comes easier and more
comparisons, which allows citizens to better understand
the relative performance of their governments and
reward or punish politicians accordingly.71
Third, competition keeps local government budgets in
check. Theory suggests that bureaucrats are budgetmaximizers72 and governments are revenuemaximizers.73 Without competition through
fragmentation, local governments have incentives to
continue to grow their budgets through tax increases
without increasing service quality. Just as monopolies in
the marketplace lead to higher prices and lower quality,
government monopoly leads to higher taxes and worse
service provision.74 Competition makes governments
directly accountable for relative increases in taxes or
reduced service quality.
8
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In terms of providing citizens what they want out of
their local government, there are three reasons for why
larger, consolidated governments are theorized to be
less efficient. First, the Tiebout model of competition
(voting with your feet) is framed as a way of solving the
preference revelation problem of public goods. In the
marketplace, people “reveal their preferences” for a
good based upon whether they are willing to purchase
the good or not. With government, however, it is
difficult to determine how much people really value the
services they are receiving since they are typically
financed through taxes rather than user fees. But in the
Tiebout model, moving or not moving is a market-like
test that reveals people’s preferences for public goods.
With more local governments there is more variety with
public goods, thus enabling citizens to reveal and enjoy
the public goods they desire by moving between
municipalities.
Second, citizens are likely to be better informed and
heard at the local level.75 Citizens find it easier to learn
about issues happening in their town than state or
nation-wide problems. And once informed, it is
generally easier to communicate with local politicians
than it is with state or federal elected officials. Better
informed, more vocal citizens are more likely to hold
local governments accountable.
Third, with fragmented services, citizens are able to
precisely express their preferences for a particular
service.76 For example, if citizens pay a fee specifically
for waste removal, they can clearly determine whether
the fee is worth the service provided. Citizens get the
services they want and do not get the services that they
do not want. There is no ‘full line forcing’ where
citizens pay one fee for a bundle of services, regardless
of whether they value each service.77 With larger,
consolidated governments, citizens have a harder time
evaluating the value of each service and may be forced
into paying for a service that they do not value. This is
inefficient because citizens do not get what they want.
Although the cost and competition arguments for
fragmentation are not features of the St. Louis
consolidation debate, citizens getting what they want
out of local government is a key aspect of the debate.
Jones78 argues that St. Louis residents value having
HALL AND MATTI

cosmopolitan amenities nearby but with the small-town
feel that comes from small municipal governments. As
the Tiebout model suggests, migration into these smaller
municipalities has revealed a preference for small
municipal governments.
Another example pertaining to citizen preferences
comes from the failed consolidation attempt of five fire
departments in the center of St. Louis County.79 One of
the municipalities, Rock Hill, dropped out of the
consolidation because their spending for fire protection
would have increased from $75,000 to $100,000.
Consistent with Boyne,80 consolidating specific services
rather than having one large consolidation enables
citizens to better determine the value of the services
they are receiving. Those in Rock Hill could easily weigh
the costs and benefits and decide to forgo
consolidation. However, with a single, county-wide
consolidation of all services, it would be difficult to
evaluate the value of each service. This tends to drive up
the costs of municipal services.
Although within the consolidation debate in St. Louis
arguments have emerged supporting fragmented
government because of efficiency, Better Together
raises concerns about local political participation.
Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren81 theorize that at the local
level citizens are better informed and better able to
voice concerns. Citizens keep elected officials
accountable and can meet with local officials to have
their voice heard. Better Together finds that many of
the small municipal governments in St. Louis County
have part-time staff with limited office hours. This
makes it difficult to meet with local representatives.
Additionally, Better Together argues that with so many
municipalities, the media does not hold elected officials
accountable. With the media’s focus on larger
jurisdictions, it is actually more difficult for citizens to
be informed about their local government.
3.2 Equity
The theoretical arguments against consolidation based
on equity grounds rest upon two ideas. First,
consolidated governments may not act in the best
interest of poor or minority residents. In smaller
jurisdictions with a majority of poor and racial
9
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minorities, residents can vote to get the services they
demand most.82 Mixed into a larger jurisdiction
dominated by wealthy residents, poor residents may see
their tax dollars being used to finance public projects
that are lower priorities for the community, such as a
renovated opera house or light rail to a major shopping
area. Since poor residents typically have less political
power, they are likely to see their tax dollars benefitting
wealthier, more politically powerful residents.83 This
problem can be avoided by not consolidating.
Another concern with consolidation negatively
impacting poor or minority residents is the loss of
minority public officials. Citizens care about racially
representative public officials,84 and this is easier to
achieve in smaller jurisdictions where minority
populations have voting power. Within larger
jurisdictions public officials are less likely to be racially
representative as minority voting strength is
diminished.85
The second equity argument against consolidation is
that consolidation is not the only way to address equity
concerns. There are more efficient ways, one being state
and federal redistribution programs.86 Local
governments typically have not been involved with
redistribution as areas with mobile tax bases limit
redistribution attempts.87 Local governments, even
when aggregated up to the county-level are generally less
efficient at operating redistribution programs than larger
governments. There is an optimal level of government
for each service, and redistribution services tend to
operate best at higher level of governments.
Another way to address equity without consolidation is
through the use of special districts. Special districts
covering multiple jurisdictions can provide both rich
and poor residents with the same service quality.88
Equity concerns are valid, but the theory suggests that
consolidation can worsen inequality and that inequality
can be solved more effectively through means besides
consolidation.
Concerns about a loss of equity from consolidation has
been part of the discussion in St. Louis. The primary
organization pushing for consolidation, Better Together,
is well aware of how equity concerns could prevent
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consolidation from gaining approval. In September
2017, a board member of Better Together, Dr. Will
Ross, wrote an editorial in a local newspaper addressing
racial concerns.89 Ross argues that many of the issues
that those in the black community are concerned about
are regional in nature. Thus, consolidation can actually
improve the well-being of those in the black
community. He also warns, however, that consolidation
does not guarantee equity in political representation, and
that those in the black community should actively
participate in shaping the consolidation process.
Whether those in the black community decide to
participate in and influence the consolidation process is
uncertain as black mayors in the northern municipalities
are concerned about being pushed out of existence.90
Consistent with Zimmerman,91 black mayors are
concerned with the dilution of minority voting strength
following consolidation.
Another relevant equity consideration in St. Louis is the
feasibility of consolidation. Suburbs may view the
consolidation as an unfair way for St. Louis City to
share its debts and gain access to a larger tax base.92
Wealthy suburban residents and elected officials are
unlikely to agree to consolidation terms that make them
worse off. Consistent with Parks and Oakerson,93
wealthy and politically connected residents are likely to
try to shape consolidation in their favor. The result for
the St. Louis region would be even greater inequality.
3.3. Spillovers
Although theoretical arguments exist for how
consolidation can solve spillover problems, there are
ways for smaller local governments to overcome
spillovers. First, in the case of a local government
providing a public good with a positive spillover, grants
from higher levels of government could compensate the
local government.94 Bish and Warren95 explain how this
type of grant system could work with education.
Education creates a positive externality as school
districts cannot internalize all the benefits they produce.
Students that receive an education may become
productive workers in other jurisdictions.
The second way for local governments to deal with
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spillovers is through the creation of special districts.
There are different types of public goods with different
optimal sizes of operation.96 Different public goods
come with different spillovers. Consolidation into a
single government does not, therefore, solve the
spillover problem for each public good. A better
solution is to retain local autonomy but use special
districts of different sizes for public goods with
different spillovers. With public goods where there are
large spillovers, then the optimal size of the special
district would be large. But with public goods where
there are small spillovers, then the optimal size of the
special district would be small.
The use of special districts is a small part of the third
way in which local governments can overcome spillover
problems. Local governments can cooperate not only
with special districts but also in a wide variety of
creative ways. The Coase Theorem97 suggests that
private individuals can solve externality problems
through negotiation. Similarly, Feiock98 argues that local
governments can overcome spillovers by collaboratively
solving spillover problems with formal and informal
agreements. Such agreements tend to be more politically
possible and are better suited to deal with the dynamic
nature of spillover problems.99 New agreements can be
worked out as new spillovers emerge. And should the
spillovers diminish or other issues arise, these
agreements can be amended or dissolved less painfully
because there still exists and underlying political body.
Examples of each of the three theoretical reasons for
the effectiveness of local governments in dealing with
spillovers have surfaced in the St. Louis debate.
Consistent with Ostrom,100 financing from larger
governments has been used in the St. Louis area before.
With the building of a new sports stadium, 50% of the
financing came from the state government.101 Since the
benefits of a major sports team may extend beyond city
and county boundaries, the state government was
willing to contribute to the project. The spillover
problem was potentially solved through financing from
a larger government, although it remains an open
question whether the benefits to the rest of the state
were commensurate with costs.
Consistent with Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren, 102 and
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Bish and Warren,103 special districts of varying sizes exist
in the St. Louis area. The St. Louis area has one regional
arts commission but two districts for parks.104 Parks and
the arts generate different benefits and different sized
special districts can most appropriately internalize the
unique spillovers of each public good. A full-scale
consolidation would eliminate the ability of different
sized special districts to deal with different sized
spillover problems.
Consistent with Andrew105 and Feiock106 the ability of
local governments to cooperate has been part of the
consolidation debate in St. Louis. In a recent newspaper
article, Rebe107 argues that rather than fighting over a
contentious consolidation, St. Louis would be better off
collaborating on specific region-wide problems. In the
article, Rebe highlights how the region’s municipalities
cooperated to form the Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer
District in 1954. The charter for the district highlights
the importance of cooperation to overcome spillovers:
“the problem has been shown to be one which cannot
be solved within either City or County alone, but
requires that it be treated as a whole. The City limits are
but an imaginary line as far as disease and drainage are
concerned.” Disease and drainage are both examples of
negative spillovers. However, rather than consolidation,
the problem was solved through local government
cooperation.
3.4 Development
A large theoretical literature identifies the benefits of
fragmented governments in terms of efficiency, equity,
and spillovers. No body of theoretical research identifies
the benefits of fragmentation for development,
however. All that exists is the idea that through
competition local governance will improve and through
better governance comes more development. Kim and
Jurey108 summarize the connection between
fragmentation and development. First, fragmentation
promotes local government competition. Second,
competition incentivizes each jurisdiction to provide an
attractive combination of quality services and low taxes.
Third, with an attractive combination of quality services
and low taxes, new businesses and residents will be draw
to the region. The result is more jobs and higher
income.
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The above argument for development through
fragmentation has not been present in the St. Louis
consolidation debate. Those in favor of consolidation
have done so in part for development reasons.
However, those opposed to consolidation have not
focused on development in their arguments.
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Theoretical arguments exist in favor of and in
opposition to consolidation for efficiency, equity,
spillover, and development reasons. With the exception
of development, the consolidation debate in St. Louis
contains arguments both for and in opposition to
consolidation that relate to the theoretical literature
reviewed. However, what real-world evidence exists for
understanding how consolidation impacts efficiency,
equity, spillover, and development concerns? This
section explores the empirical evidence because before
drawing any lessons for St. Louis, it is important to first
understand what has happened following other
consolidations.
4.1 Efficiency
Both in the St. Louis debate and theoretical literature,
proponents of consolidation have argued that it leads to
greater efficiency. The real world evidence suggests that
greater efficiency can be difficult to achieve, however.
Because streamlining local government means either
cutting government jobs or reducing wages, bureaucrats
are unlikely to favor a consolidation that does either
one. Thus, it unsurprising that in the real-world
consolidation generally does not lead to a more
streamlined, efficient bureaucracy. For example, wages
after consolidation tend to be harmonized upwards to
the highest pre-consolidation pay scales.109 In their study
of 21 consolidated municipalities in Canada, Miljan and
Spicer 110 found that government workers that had been
earning roughly minimum wage working in relatively
low cost-of-living areas saw their wages rise to those of
workers living in more urban, higher cost-of-living
areas. Wage harmonization upward does not lead to a
less expensive bureaucracy, but a more expensive
government.
Consolidations also tend to increase public employee
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wages. If some employees associated with administrative
duplication are let go, consolidation could still be
efficiency-enhancing. Even so, just like no public
employee wants to see their wages reduced, no public
employee wants to lose their job. Unsurprisingly,
consolidation does not eliminate administrative
duplication. Either formally or informally, jobs for
public employees are maintained. The charters for both
the Athens and Clark County, Georgia and Wyandotte
County and Kansas City, Kansas consolidations, for
instance, included provisions guaranteeing that no
public employee jobs would be lost.111 While this could
be a short-term effect if departing or retiring employees
are not replaced, in practice once consolidation occurs
the impetus for a reduction in force is reduced and
overall staffing levels tend to stay high. In a more
informal manner, during the consolidation of Kawartha
Lakes, Ontario, new positions were simply created for
existing government employees to fill.112 Although not
formally codified in the charter, jobs were created so
that no existing employee would become unemployed.
Another piece of evidence in favor of the efficiency of
fragmentation over consolidation comes from studying
the bureaucratic complexity of consolidation
governments. Reese113 finds that with the consolidation
of twelve municipalities in Ottawa, workers in the now
larger departments were burdened by “increased red
tape for both internal and external users of city services,
slower purchasing processes, a backlog in dealing with
permits, and a much longer hiring process” (p. 600).
‘Bureaucratic congestion’ not only slows government
down, but it also can require costly new technology and
retraining. Vojnovic114 studies how five municipalities in
Canada adjusted to the new, larger bureaucratic
structure of their consolidated government. He finds
that four out of the five municipalities had to invest in
substantial employee retraining and new computers to
deal with more complex accounting and payroll systems.
Although much of the real-world evidence provides a
cautionary tale against relying upon consolidation to
achieve efficiency, there are examples of cost saving
through consolidation. Krimmel115 finds that
consolidated police departments in York and Lancaster
Counties in Pennsylvania have 28% lower costs
compared to their nonconsolidated counterparts.
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Additionally, McDavid116 finds that police departments
in Halifax, Canada were able to reduce costs through
consolidation, without negatively affecting the crime
rate. Consolidation can produce efficiency gains for
services such as police. Consolidations for services such
as police do not require a single, unified government,
however. Consolidation can be handled on a service-byservice basis.
4.2 Equity
The real-world evidence suggests that a few of the
equity concerns of consolidation have occurred in other
cases. First, consolidation has diluted the voting
strength of minority populations. Clarke117 finds that
black voting strength in the center of the city was
diluted following the consolidation of Louisville and
Jefferson County, Kentucky. Similarly, Swanson118 finds
that after the consolidation of Jacksonville and Duval
County, Florida, black voting power was diluted from
40% to 25%.
Second, consolidation sometimes has led to greater
inequity in service provision by income level as the
terms of consolidation are shaped by wealthy, politically
powerful elites. Blomquist and Parks119 demonstrate
how the Indianapolis city-county consolidation
produced greater inequality. The consolidation was
meant to correct for inequality by using suburban
property taxes to help pay for city services enjoyed by
suburban residents. However, wealthy suburban
residents were politically connected while poor inner
city residents were not. Unsurprisingly, the terms of the
consolidation benefitted suburbanites. Suburban
property taxes were used only to pay for county-wide
services while city property taxes were used to pay for
both city and county-wide services.
Vojnovic120 provides another example of a tax increase
for poor residents following consolidation. He studies
the consolidation of five relatively wealthy urban
districts and six relatively poor rural districts in Canada.
Before consolidation, the rural areas had lower service
levels but also enjoyed lower taxes. However, after
consolidation tax rates were harmonized so that some
rural areas saw tax increases of up to 80%, despite no
clear increase in service provision.
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4.3 Spillovers
There are numerous examples of institutional
arrangements across the United States that effectively
solve spillover problems. These institutional
arrangements operate across a spectrum of formality.
On the more formal end are fully consolidated regional
governments. On the less formal end are interlocal
agreements (ILAs). ILAs allow for local government
autonomy while collaborating with other governments
to take advantage of economies of scale with the
provision of services. Although there are many
examples, commonly used ILAs include 911 dispatch
centers, libraries, and pest control.121 One city that
makes extensive use of ILAs is Detroit. Leroux and
Carr122 show how 44 local governments in the Detroit
metropolitan area use interpersonal networks and local
professional associations to collaborate on projects such
as infrastructure improvements, waste disposal, and
watershed management.
Healthy civic institutions in Detroit help build
connections between local representatives. The result is
cooperation among governments rather than
competition. Another way healthy civic institutions can
help solve spillovers is with non-profit organizations.
Nunn and Rosentraub123 describe the operation of the
Alleghany Conference for Community Development
(ACCD) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Through publicprivate partnerships, the non-profit organization helps
with a variety of regional issues includes air pollution
and flood control.
An example of a more formal, although not fully
consolidated institutional arrangement is the council of
governments. Local governments maintain autonomy
but representatives meet regularly at the council of
governments to discuss regional issues. Toledo provides
an example: Since 1968 the Toledo Metropolitan Area
Council of Governments (TMACOG) has sought to:
“(1) provide a forum for regional governance, (2)
facilitate networking for local officials, (3) provide
shared information, (4) coordinate issue resolution, (5)
plan for regional transportation needs, and (6) plan for
regional environmental resources and water quality.” 124
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4.4 Development
Consolidation is theorized to accelerate development by
providing comprehensive planning capacity, a
simplification of regulations, and a greater capacity for
regional development projects. Does consolidation
actually improve local development in the real-world?
The empirical evidence suggests that consolidation
rarely leads to significant economic development.
Sometimes it actually reduces the rate of development,
but usually it has no impact in either direction.
Empirical studies finding no impact of city-county
consolidation on development include Feiock and
Carr,125 Carr and Feiock,126 Carr et al.,127 and Faulk and
Schansberg.128 Examining the number of
manufacturing, retail, and service establishments both
before and after the Jacksonville-Duval County
consolidation in Florida, Feiock and Carr129 find no
impact of consolidation on growth in any sector.
Expanding the number of city-county consolidations
explored to nine, Carr and Feiock 130 find no evidence
for faster growth in any sector for any of the nine cases.
Carr et al.131 expand the analysis to include the impact of
consolidation on employment and payroll. They find no
effect with the Louisville-Jefferson County and the
Lexington-Fayette County consolidations in Kentucky.
More recently, Faulk and Schansberg132 find that
consolidation with the Augusta-Richmond County,
Kansas City-Wyandote County, and Lafayette CityLafayette Parish did not lead to a significant increase in
employment or the number of businesses.
While the majority of city-county consolidations
explored had no impact on economic development,
Hall, Matti, and Zhou133 do find a positive impact of the
Lafayette City-Lafayette Parish consolidation on per
capita personal income, total employment, and
population. But they also find negative impacts on per
capita personal income, total employment, and
population stemming from the Augusta-Richmond
County and Athens-Clarke County consolidations in
Georgia. Different development impacts across
different consolidation attempts suggest that the details
of how consolidation is implemented are important.
Consolidations that are widely opposed tend not to be
successful, as the political bargaining necessary to get
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people to change their minds often undermines the very
reason the reform was implemented. An example would
be guarantees that no public sector employees will lose
their jobs as a result of the consolidation, although the
raison d’etre for the consolidation was to achieve cost
savings through eliminating duplicate positions.
5. LESSONS FOR ST. LOUIS FROM THE
ACADEMIC LITERATURE
The situation that St. Louis residents find themselves in
is not unique. A number of areas in the United States
have seen local government fragmentation as a key
source of municipal dysfunction. The typical
governmental form that is advocated is city-county
consolidation that creates one unified county-level
government, but other forms of consolidation have also
been suggested and implemented depending on the
region. Much of the literature focuses on city-county
consolidation, however, because all of the United States
is covered by county (or county-equivalent)
governments. They are naturally small, due to the fact
that in many cases their creation was predicated on
reducing the burden on citizens needing to travel to the
county seat. As such, they seem to be the natural
stopping point when the discussion of eliminating or
combining local governments begins. It is therefore
natural that discussions in St Louis have focused on
city-county consolidation.
There exist many good arguments and evidence that the
fragmentation of local government in St. Louis has and
will continue to produce sub-optimal outcomes. The use
of court fees to finance local government, for example,
goes against numerous principles of effective local
governance. The same is true with the widespread use of
sales taxes rather than property taxes to fund local
governments. When combined with excessive
fragmentation, the result is too much attention paid to
tax exporting and not enough to providing the tax and
spending mix preferred by the average resident. Areas
that are a good value (i.e., services received relative to
taxes paid) see that increased value capitalized into
housing prices, which then lead to the property taxes
received (not the rate) increasing, a virtuous cycle. When
local governments are incentivized to find tax-exporting
industries, too much attention is paid to courting big
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projects that attract consumers from across the city.
Cities that successfully export a large share of their tax
burden look good in the eyes of residents because they
can enjoy high service levels at a low cost. This
encourages even more areas to pursue tax-exporting
strategies, something that may work for one area initially
but does not work on a regional level. This negative
cycle seems to exist in parts of St. Louis today. While it
is good for the citizens of the area, it is bad for the
region as a whole.
Just because problems exist, however, does not mean
city-county consolidation is necessarily the only or best
solution to the problems facing the residents of St.
Louis County. From our own original research on citycounty consolidation134 and our review of the academic
literature on regionalization and consolidation of
municipal services135 we highlight five important lessons
regarding city-county consolidation that citizens and
policymakers in St. Louis City and County should
consider when attempting to move forward from the
status quo.
Lesson One: City-county consolidations have not been a
panacea to the underlying problem that motivated
consolidation efforts.136 While many of the studies
analyzing specific consolidations focus on economic
development, it is important to remember that
governments that are able to satisfy demands for local
publicly-provided goods at a lower tax cost should
stimulate economic development as people and
businesses are attracted to value creation. The fact that
incomes, population growth, and employment
opportunities frequently decline following city-county
consolidation is strong evidence that fragmentation was
not necessarily the biggest issue facing the area but
rather part of a larger problem.
Lesson Two: Many of the problems facing those living
and working in St. Louis County are not the result of
fragmentation per se, but rather how fragmentation
interacts with local government funding in Missouri.
The fact that local governments in Missouri were
prohibited from using the sales tax to raise revenue
prior to 1969 makes it clear that this is a local problem
created by state policy and therefore is going to require
state action to fix. It is true that fragmentation has
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exacerbated the problem related to how local
governments in Missouri are financed, but city-county
consolidation will only mitigate issues related to how
local governments in Missouri (specifically the St. Louis
County) are financed, not eliminate them. To cite but
one example, beggar-thy-neighbor policies will still exist,
but there will just be less of it as consumers will have to
come into (or leave) the County.
Some part of the solution is likely to require state policy
action that changes how local governments obtain
revenue. If Missouri policymakers returned to the pre1969 prohibition on local governments utilizing the
sales tax, for example, it would eliminate the disparities
and inefficiencies of the current system. What would
local governments replace it with? One option would be
that the state could allow for county sales taxes to be
distributed to local governments on a per capita basis.
Alternatively, the county sales tax could be combined
with a consolidation of some services to the county
level, reducing the service burden on local governments
concomitant with their lower tax revenue, but achieving
economies of scale and efficiencies in areas like transit
and fire protection. In Ohio, for example, regional
transit authorities are funded through county-level sales
taxes, reflecting the fact that optimal service area for
public transit is much larger than the typical city
government. Funding local governments through a
regional tax also could reduce the incentive to uses fees,
fines, and tickets to pay for local government.
Lesson Three: City-county consolidations are deeply
unpopular.137 The hatred and mistrust associated with
consolidation efforts significantly raises the costs of
consolidation and reduces the likelihood that it will
solve the underlying issues that motivated consolidation.
As we detail elsewhere,138 city-county consolidations in
Georgia were extremely contentious. Athens-Clarke
County Georgia, and Augusta-Richmond County
Georgia had multiple failed consolidation attempts
before finally getting a majority of voters to favor
consolidation. In both cases, convincing enough voters
to support the consolidation referendum required
changes to the consolidation charter that led to the
consolidation not achieving the goal of greater
economic development. The biggest of these changes
was upward public employee wage harmonization and
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guarantees that no public employee jobs would be lost.
The lack of public opposition to city-county
consolidation makes it more likely that consolidation
will achieve its goals and seems to be a prerequisite for
successful city-county consolidation. On the other
hand, the more organized opposition to consolidation
is, the greater the likelihood that political compromises
will be made that undermine any potential benefits of
reform. In the face of widespread opposition to largescale consolidation, piecemeal consolidation and/or
regional agreements are preferable as they can be
structured to be less divisive, such as in the
consolidation of fire departments.
Lesson Four: Not all consolidations are created equal.
Leland and Thurmeier139 distinguish between crisis
consolidations and opportunity consolidations. Areas
that consolidate due to a crisis, primarily financial,
frequently fail to improve (economically) following
consolidation. In many cases it is better to stay with the
status quo than to accept a deal in the midst of a crisis
because “something is better than nothing”. Our
research suggests that no change is often better than
consolidations that occur in response to a crisis.
More important to St. Louis, however, is that many
consolidations merely involve merging a city center with
an unincorporated, more rural, county area. While St.
Louis County has unincorporated areas, it also has
multiple, developed municipalities.140 This creates a large
number of veto players and vested interests that make
large-scale consolidation from the bottom up very
difficult to achieve. Capps141 actually calls for a statewide
ballot or the Missouri legislature to weigh in to avoid
these political issues. The difficulty with bypassing local
voters is that while there are fewer veto players, the
solution is not likely to be one that will represent
important trade-offs between local autonomy and fiscal
responsibility.
Lesson Five: If the goal of consolidation is to eliminate
disparities across areas of the city in funding or services,
eliminating local governments can sometimes give the
illusion of the disparities being eliminated when often
things are much worse due to shifts in political power.
Consider two equally sized school districts that spend
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$10,000 and $15,000 per pupil, respectively. If those two
districts consolidate, then average spending is now
$12,500, so it appears that the disparities have been
eliminated. The real question, however, is how has
spending in the section of the combined school district
that used to spend $10,000 changed? In many cases, it
does not improve or even gets worse. There are two
reasons why this is the case. First, aggregation of data
obscures the problem and reduces political pressure to
do something about it. Second, poorer areas tend to
have lower vote turnout and thus voters in the poorer
part of the consolidated school district have less
political power after consolidation.
6. CONCLUSION
No one can deny that there are numerous issues facing
local governments and their citizens in St. Louis County.
Fragmentation, combined with the taxation powers and
funding allocated to local governments by the Missouri
state legislature, has contributed to a number of issues
related to communities engaging in activities with
negative effects on citizens other than their own. The
significant use of speed traps, or excessive fines, to
raises a significant portion of municipal funds is but the
most egregious example.
Our analysis of the past several decades of academic
scholarship on regionalization of municipal taxes and
services and city-county consolidation suggests that
widespread consolidation is unpopular and fails to
deliver on more efficient government. The fact that
there is no silver bullet, however, does not mean that
taking no action is optimal. One of the great strengths
of the United States is our large number of local
governments. The literature has highlighted some of the
many ways that communities can collaborate to save
money and achieve scale efficiencies without
consolidating. In addition, our analysis of the 142St.
Louis case highlights how any significant reform is likely
to involve the Missouri legislature as many of the local
government funding issues are problems created by
state policy and only exacerbated by political
fragmentation in St. Louis County.
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